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This brief by Philip Arestis and Santonu Basu addresses a gap between the
theory and practice of financial globalization. Ideally, global markets can
allocate borrowed money to those industries and economies where it will
be most productive.To take one example,the builders of the U.S.railroads
were able to tap lenders from all over the world in the 19th century, just as
foreign laborers helped to lay the track.
But this textbook example paints a misleading picture of the operation
of international capital markets. The late 1800s, a period of open financial
markets, saw numerous bank failures around the world and deflation in
the United States.Recent times offer many more examples of the problems
that accompany globalization. Some Latin American countries have not
regained the ground they lost during the defaults of the 1980s.A long string
of financial panics has led to the collapse of currencies in Asia,Russia,and
elsewhere during the past decade.
These crises, which appear in the headlines every so often, are dis-
cussed more prominently than the difficulties many economies have in
attracting capital in the first place.The financial community often uses the
term “country risk”to refer to potential losses in certain markets.The most
important of these potential losses is exchange rate risk, the risk that a
profitable venture will not translate into gains in a “hard currency”such as
the dollar or the yen. Exporters have greater access to foreign loans than
do firms that produce for domestic buyers, because the former can expect
earnings in “reserve”currencies.The requirement that potential borrowers
have some prospect of acquiring foreign currency makes foreign capital
markets less accessible to those borrowers than whatever sources of loans
may exist internally.
The international lending institutions, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have an answer for this problem: bolster
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the value of the currency of the nation in need of capital through tight
government finance, even at the expense of immediate economic growth.
Keeping government spending in check and interest rates high will,accord-
ing to these institutions, stabilize the currency and attract international
investors. The problem is that, as the case of Argentina shows, these cures
are often worse than the disease,and IMF nostrums and other tight money
policies are inevitably abandoned.
Is there some other solution, one that enables small economies to
obtain capital without accepting crippling austerity measures? Arestis and
Basu argue for an alternative form of globalization,one that would provide
more countries with access to foreign capital. Paradoxically, their proposal
does not call for the further erosion of regulatory barriers between coun-
tries. Instead, Arestis and Basu argue for a more orderly global market,
supervised by an International Central Bank (ICB). This central bank
would have a currency of its own, which would be used only by national
central banks.
How would such a bank ensure that capital found its way into more
corners of the world? It would deal with temporary imbalances in interna-
tional borrowing by using a kind of overdraft protection of the type most
central banks offer their own member private banks. The ICB would also
help states deal with medium- and long-term current account and balance
of payment deficits, which can undermine currency values. It would do so
by providing prudent loans to debtor nations or encouraging nations with
current account surpluses to buy more goods from the world market.
The goal is to make globalization work for the whole spectrum of
economies,from the very rich to the very poor.In the end,all nations would
benefit.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Introduction
In 2002 more than $1 trillion worth of new bonds was sold across interna-
tional boundaries. The total stock of cross-border bond holdings was
more than $9 trillion. Such lending, together with sales of equities, is
regarded as one of the chief benefits of globalization. But financial invest-
ment does not always flow where it is needed most. While it appears that
the world cannot be satiated with U.S. securities, issues of emerging
economies account for less than 6 percent of total international holdings
of debt securities (D’Arista 2003). And, as Argentina discovered recently,
international lenders can be fickle, selling enough foreign currency and
securities to cause a currency crisis.
International capital flows are touted as one of the benefits of global-
ization, and a great many steps have been taken over the past 30 years to
make it easier for banks and investors to lend money in foreign markets.
These measures have included eliminating capital controls and limits on
interest rates. In theory, investing across borders enables countries that
lack capital, including many developing nations, to obtain the funds they
need for industrialization. However, although breaking down some
regulatory barriers can, potentially, increase the efficiency of the world
economy and spur growth, a truly globalized financial market that bene-
fits all countries will not exist in the absence of an appropriate set of global
institutions.When globalization in practice amounts to nothing but liber-
alization or the breaking down of barriers between countries, it tends to
leave much of the developing world out of the picture.This sort of liberal-
ization invites destabilizing speculation and accentuates international
inequalities in access to capital rather than narrowing them.
This brief describes the evolution of global finance up to the present,
states the rationale for deregulating financial markets, and points out
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some deep flaws in the current financial system.The authors then propose
the establishment of an international monetary authority, with its own
currency, as a means of completing the process of globalization on terms
fair to all.
The Beginnings of a Cycle of Globalization
The first age of unregulated financial globalization, from the 1870s to
1913, saw the emergence of nascent international financial institutions
and markets (Eichengreen and Bordo 2002). During those years, interna-
tional capital mobility reached a level not seen again until late in the 20th
century. The first period of free capital markets was marked by a series of
banking crises caused by speculation, excessive lending, poor manage-
ment, lack of effective regulation, and concealment of information. The
history of international financial sector development in the interwar
period, 1919 to 1939, was not a particularly happy one either; in fact, it
was deeply scarred by the 1920s stock market collapse and ensuing Great
Depression.
At the end of World War II, various controls, including fixed exchange
rates and restrictions on international flows of capital, were imposed on
international finance in order to maintain financial stability. International
leaders, recognizing that currency and financial markets would be vulnera-
ble to destabilizing outflows of funds unless some regulations were in place,
put limits on purchases of foreign currency and lending across borders.
Many nations also took steps to ensure that industry had access to
needed capital on easy terms.In numerous cases,they capped interest rates
and established specialized banks dedicated to particular industries. A
number of governments guaranteed loans, or forced financial institutions
to lend to companies that would not otherwise have qualified for credit.
All of these regulations were imposed in widespread recognition that,
to use the language of modern economics,credit markets did not resemble
“perfect markets,” which would, hypothetically, allow any creditworthy
firm to borrow an unlimited amount of money for worthwhile projects.
The fact that lenders could not be assured that their loans would be repaid
limited the availability and affordability of credit, even for potential bor-
rowers who intended to repay their loans. In the absence of governmentThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
intervention, policymakers realized, worthy borrowers who failed to meet
credit standards might be unable to obtain capital. In particular, newly
developing industries might lack sufficient collateral or cash flow.
The use of barriers to the free,unregulated movement of capital would
make developing economies less subject to the whims of foreign investors.
With adequate supplies of credit in place, policymakers believed, financial
markets would remain stable and governments could use loans as a tool to
promote their economic and social objectives (Sayers 1960; Basu 2002). In
some cases,such as South Korea,interventionist policies were spectacularly
successful. However, by the 1960s, many scholars and policymakers began
to have second thoughts about the desirability of tight financial regulation.
The Turn Toward Liberalization
The case for deregulation of financial markets was based on the efficiency
of a free market in capital. Free-market “reformers” envisioned a com-
pletely liberalized, ideal system in which the interest rate would control the
allocation of credit. Firms would not have access to subsidized loans. Since
no industry or firm would be given favorable treatment, all would have to
meet the same standards of creditworthiness and pay market interest rates.
This system would ensure that capital was allocated to its most productive
uses; all projects whose predicted return was greater than the rate of inter-
est would be funded,while less profitable ventures would not be viable.
Financial deregulation would not only direct capital flows to their
most productive uses, reformers argued, it would also increase total sav-
ings available in the economy (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). When caps
on interest rates were lifted, the incentive to save would be increased, and
all creditworthy borrowers would be able to obtain loans. By taking the
further step of eliminating restrictions on international purchases of cur-
rency and allowing foreign banks to serve domestic borrowers, economies
could also draw upon foreign sources of capital.
Around the same time that financial reform became a topic of discus-
sion,many economists proffered a related set of arguments regarding trade
balances. Until the 1970s, governments around the world often pegged
their currencies,or set their values at a fixed level,by purchasing and selling
currency on international markets. This practice, some claimed, could10 Public Policy Brief, No. 75
make imports or exports artificially expensive and, possibly, prevent the
attainment of a zero trade balance (Krueger 1974; Cordon 1981).
Restrictions on foreign direct investment (acquiring capital goods or equity
in foreign countries) might further aggravate the problem, because a lack
of such investment could force companies to take on excessive debt.
According to some economists, allowing the exchange rate to “float”
would bring about a balance of imports and exports in the following way.
If,f or example, Argentina were running a trade deficit, the value of the
peso would fall because firms would sell pesos and demand foreign cur-
rency needed to purchase goods and services from abroad. A decrease in
the exchange rate would,in turn,have the effect of automatically correcting
the imbalance of trade, because it would increase the peso price of foreign
goods and lower the price of Argentinian goods in foreign markets.
Eventually,the peso,after reaching a level at which trade was perfectly bal-
anced, would stop depreciating. Proponents of this strategy felt it was
important to allow exchange rates to move freely and reach their “natural”
level, eliminating trade imbalances in the process.
All of these arguments for financial and foreign exchange liberaliza-
tion had an impact; country after country joined the currency-float trend
and removed financial regulations of various types. It was thought that
liberalization of financial markets would improve efficiency, spur growth,
and clear the way for capital to move freely from one country to another.
The speed of capital’s movement was further enhanced by advances in
information technology. All of these developments have fostered the
impression that financial markets are now globalized.But,after 30 years of
reforms, the ideal of a global capital market has not yet been reached.
Problems of Financial Globalization: Instability and
Differences in Access
In a world in which restrictions on international capital flows have been
nearly eliminated, why do some countries, industries, and firms still have
so much trouble obtaining loans? The answer lies, of course, in the risk of
default.Domestic lenders cannot be assured of the complete safety of their
loans, but foreign borrowers face the additional problem of having to pay
interest in dollars, euros, or yen, rather than in domestic currency. Even ifThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
a project is profitable in terms of domestic currency, the possibility
remains that the currency will depreciate or completely lose convertibility.
If this occurs, the value of the project’s revenues (in terms of dollars, yen,
or euros) will be lower than the value of the required loan payments.
Lenders who are concerned about this sort of “exchange rate risk”
usually demand that the borrower provide some form of collateral. In the
case of foreign loans, collateral must take the form of assets that can be
sold for an internationally recognized currency. Usually, only industries or
nations with strong export earnings can provide such assets. If the loan is
not used to develop export industries, some alternative source of foreign
currency must be made available.Hence,firms must meet what is in essence
a higher credit standard for international loans than for domestic ones.
This means there are two separate sources for loans,and the foreign source
is simply inaccessible to certain countries and certain borrowers. Small
wonder that ratios of investment to GDP are still correlated with saving
rates;to a large extent,capital accumulation is still dependent upon domes-
tic saving. In this case, the ideal of an international market is not realized.
The system not only excludes many borrowers, it is biased toward
already thriving industries and nations. A healthy export industry can
readily obtain credit because of the internationally marketable assets that
it holds. Credit allows the industry to expand and increases the value of
the industry’s assets, which, in turn, can be used to secure more debt. On
the other hand, if an industry fails to earn sufficient foreign currency, its
assets will fall in value,thereby reducing access to credit.This vicious cycle
can turn a small setback into a bankruptcy or currency collapse.
Even when a nation is able to borrow on international financial mar-
kets, it may quickly lose access to funds if investors panic. Several of the
emerging Asian economies,including those of Thailand and Malaysia,suf-
fered greatly in 1997 when international investors began to dump assets
denominated in baht and ringgit. Through a process known as contagion,
fears of the collapse of one currency can spread to nearby markets,leading
investors to withdraw from several economies simultaneously. What
would otherwise be a minor, local crisis can take on continental propor-
tions, and affected countries might have been better off not borrowing on
international markets in the first place.12 Public Policy Brief, No. 75
Proponents of capital market liberalization argue that open financial
markets can stabilize economies by allowing them to borrow money in
hard times and share the risk of poor economic outcomes with foreign
investors.But,although there is evidence of some reduction in the volatility
of GDP when countries integrate into world capital markets,“the volatility
of consumption growth relative to that of income growth has increased
for more financially integrated developing economies in the 1990s”(Kose,
Prasad, and Terrones 2003). This suggests that the amount of goods and
services available to households can fluctuate more widely over the busi-
ness cycle in a globalized world than in an autarchic one, surely an unde-
sirable outcome.
Toward a More Inclusive Globalization
The analysis so far indicates that two problems plague the global financial
system. First, in a world where most currencies are not as highly regarded
as the euro, dollar, and yen, most countries find it difficult to convince
international lenders of their ability to repay loans in an acceptable cur-
rency. In those countries, only export industries earn sufficient foreign
currency to establish their creditworthiness. Companies may find it diffi-
cult to finance production for the domestic market, even if it seems likely
that they will make profits in the “home”currency.Second,relying on for-
eign capital can make an economy vulnerable to destabilizing forces origi-
nating elsewhere in the world.
To solve these problems without completely shutting off international
flows of capital, less-developed nations must gain access to currency that
can be used to settle debts with lending nations. One way of accomplish-
ing this would be to create an international currency and an international
monetary authority.
The new monetary authority, which would amount to a kind of IMF
with a Keynesian bent,would do more than issue currency.Consider some
of the functions of a central bank such as the Federal Reserve.Each bank has
an account at the Fed,and deposits in that account are accepted by all banks
for use as reserves.A check written on an account at bank A can be sent to
a company that deposits it at bank B. The Fed then credits bank B and
debits bank A for the appropriate amount. The Fed cancels out offsettingThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
debits and credits, so that if bank A receives 100 dollars of checks from
bank B, while 110 dollars go in the opposite direction, the Fed simply
credits bank B with 10 dollars in deposits in its account at the Fed at the
end of the day, debiting A for the same amount.
As in the previous example, most banking systems have a means for
dealing with imbalances between banks.Often,central banks extend credit to
banks that are in good standing and temporarily need more deposits in their
central bank accounts.(Other central banks,such as the Fed,help ensure that
reserves are available on a market at a steady interest rate.) If a particular
bank develops chronic liquidity problems (i.e., a lack of reserves needed to
accommodate withdrawals and debits to other banks), the central bank usu-
ally makes some effort to provide reserves temporarily,or at least make good
on the bank’s debts before shuttering it or merging it with another bank.
All of these activities undertaken by central banks prevent complete
collapses of the banking system. They prevent a “run” (massive with-
drawals) from occurring when rumors surface that a bank is about to
become insolvent, since depositors can always be assured they will be able
to withdraw their funds. Central bank operations ensure that business
borrowers will retain access to the loans they need and that all banks will
accept checks from all other banks, making good on the checks’full value.
In order to make all of this possible and to ensure prudent lending,central
banks possess regulatory power over private member banks.
An international central bank (ICB) would operate on principles sim-
ilar to those of the Federal Reserve and other national central banks. It
would have a currency of its own (analogous to the Federal Reserve
accounts of U.S. banks) that would be held only by central banks. Since
this currency could be exchanged at a fixed rate for the currencies of all
member nations, the global bank could compensate for imbalances in the
accounts of its members. Potential lenders could be confident they would
be paid back in an internationally accepted currency and would not be
vulnerable to a fall in the value of the borrowing country’s currency. This
would reduce the possibility that foreign investors would dump a coun-
try’s securities (as in a bank run), based upon rumors that the country
might not be able to manage its debts.
The benefits would be significant. First, even the weakest currencies
would be stabilized in value because they would be backed, implicitly, by14 Public Policy Brief, No. 75
the international bank. Just as U.S. banks accept each other’s checks,
knowing that the Fed will make good on them, businesses around the
world would feel more comfortable accepting payments in foreign cur-
rency. The international bank could also prevent weaknesses from arising
in the first place, by monitoring international flows of cash. As a result,
less-developed nations would find it easier to raise needed capital, even if
they lacked a source of a “reserve currency,” such as the dollar. These
nations might find it easier than before to raise capital for projects not
aimed at the markets of major industrialized nations. Countries might be
spared from the ordeal of currency and banking crises and would enjoy a
steadier flow of capital. The tilted playing field of international capital
markets would be somewhat leveled.
John Maynard Keynes proposed an ICB shortly after World War II.
1
Keynes’s suggested international currency, the Bancor, would be “fixed
(but not unalterable) in terms of gold and accepted as the equivalent of
gold . . . for the purposes of settling international balances.” Keynes’s ICB
would be based on generalizing “the essential principle of banking, as it is
exhibited within any closed system.This principle is the necessary equality
of credits and debits, of assets and liabilities.” The proposed bank “can
with safety make what advances it wishes to any of its members with the
assurance that the proceeds can only be transferred to the bank account of
another member. Its problem is solely to see to it that its members behave
themselves and that the advances made to each of them are prudent and
advisable from the point of view of the Union as a whole” (Keynes 1980,
pp. 72–73).
Existing institutions could be used to implement Keynes’s proposal.
An ICB, as part of a revamped IMF, could issue an international clearing
unit (ICU) to serve as a medium of exchange and reserve asset. The ICB
would issue ICUs in return for gold, dollars, and the reserves of other
member central banks. The ICB would, therefore, be a “double-entry
bookkeeping clearing institution,” providing overdraft services to deal
with imbalances between economies. It would try to ensure that unused
balances in countries’ accounts could be mobilized, not hoarded. It
should be committed, along with member central banks, to guaranteeing
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A sister institution to the ICB, called the International Investment
Agency (IIA), should be established as a replacement for the World Bank.
The IIA would have two specific aims. First, it would provide finance for
investment, especially to developing and emerging economies, allowing
them to industrialize without depending upon developed countries.
Second, it would stand prepared to lend ICUs to countries to help them
avoid currency crises. The latter function would be justified by the fact
that nations are at different stages of banking and economic development
and, therefore, may not run continuously balanced current accounts. In
particular, developing nations may need infusions of capital that cannot
be raised internally.
The IIA would not only ease the straits of countries with net foreign
deficits, but would encourage surplus nations to do their part to correct
imbalances. This is important because, in the existing system, countries
can cut their own demand for imports and create a bias toward a current
account surplus by reducing growth within their own countries. Deficit
countries then find themselves under pressure to reduce demand within
their own economies in order to control their deficits. The IIA would
attempt to prevent the use of this “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy, by
encouraging nations with large amounts of international reserves to invest
those reserves in its own projects or other concerns in developing nations.
The IIA would also see to it that countries that consistently ran surpluses
took steps to raise aggregate demand within their own economies (except
when income was already growing rapidly), so as to increase demand for
imports. In this way, nations could cope with current account deficits
without resigning themselves to crippling austerity measures.
Conclusion
Observers are correct in some sense when they describe capital markets as
globalized. But the perception that barriers to foreign lending are falling
masks a reality in which many nations cannot obtain needed capital, even
for potentially profitable investments. Banks and other lenders are reluc-
tant to provide money for projects that do not earn profits in currencies
that are easily convertible and internationally traded. Even countries that
raise vast amounts of capital on international markets are vulnerable to16 Public Policy Brief, No. 75
panic sales of their liabilities. The result of liberating capital from con-
straints is not always the fair or efficient allocation of funds.
To ensure that capital markets work for the benefit of all and facilitate
economic development, policymakers must create appropriate institutions
and, to some extent, limit the free movement of capital and exchange rates.
The creation of a world currency whose value is guaranteed by an ICB
would encourage lenders to serve markets that would otherwise be cut off
from the spigot of international capital. Such a bank might also prevent
currency crises of the type that increasingly plague emerging economies.
With the advent of these reforms,globalization might begin to live up to its
promise as an engine for development and prosperity.
Note
1. For a similar proposal, see Davidson (2003). In a proposal to reform
the global financial system, Stiglitz (2002) argues for substantial
changes to the IMF,World Bank, and WTO.
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